

Needs for an updated or revised EU Global Strategy

Essay

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2020
in Budapest Hungary

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Budapest, December 2019

Abstract

. The European Union's Global Strategy was welcomed by the Council in 2016. From that three years have passed and now we live in an even more contested and fragile world than we did. This instability and unpredictability put the Union's own security at stake. In order to provide our interests and the prosperity of our citizens we need to build greater coherence between our Member States. The Global Strategy is perfectly suitable for this role.

The EUGS creates a framework for better cooperation on the field of security and defence. However we need to update and revise it from time to time so that it will be always up-to-date and responsive to the new challenges and threats.

This paper examines if there is a need for an updated or revised Global Strategy now or just a few years later. I am going to review that to what extent the EUGS' objectives were implemented in the past few years and which kind of new goals should we set and which should be the next steps toward them. Nowadays euroscepticism affects the decision making process of the European Union remarkably through those decisions which are related to the common foreign and security policy. This research tries to give answers according to the current political and security environment

Europe, Global Strategy, security environment, new objectives, future step

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Preface

I am studying international security and defence policy as a civilian student of the National University of Public Service in Hungary. I have started to examine the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy in correlation with my university studies. Personally I am greatly interested in all topics related to the CSDP and I am engaged in the issue of achieving a European strategic autonomy.

I was born in an East-Central-European country where I could see the differences between being a part of the EU or not. In the initial phase of the great European integration the Eastern Bloc was hermetically separated from the rest of the continent. My parents have grown up in a world divided by the Iron Curtain while I have socialised after the political changeover in a united, joined-up Union so I can clearly see the benefits of being part of this integration and also the dark sides of being divided, due to my personal experience (family experience) and historical knowledge. I definitely believe that a strong Union is essential for the prosperity of the European citizens, especially in today's unpredictable world where the European countries cannot deal with the new challenges on their own. We need a common and integrated action plan and a Union which thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together as Federica Mogherini urged in the foreword of the EU's Global Strategy.

This paper will focus on the European Union's Global Strategy, which was welcomed by the Council in June 2016. I am going to examine if there is a need to update or revise it by studying the EUGS content and the stages of the implementations of its objectives. This is fundamental for advancing and supporting the Union's interests.

I would like to gratefully acknowledge Dr. Anna Molnár's help, valuable suggestions and discussions. Without her expertise this paper would never have fulfilled its objectives. Support was also given by Colonel Zsolt Szilágyi, without whose advices I could not have seen clearly the military aspects of the topic. Moreover, I would like to thank for the support provided by Dr. Éva Jakusné Harnos, who helped me with the proper use of English and ensured that the paper is correct grammatically.

3. Introduction

The strategic thinking within the European Union did not start with the acceptance of the EUGS in 2016. The European Council accepted the EU's first strategic document on the 12th of December in 2003. It was created parallel with the formulation of the European security and defence policy and followed the pattern of the National Security Strategy of the United States from 2002. The process was coordinated by Javier Solana. The document's main ambition was to enable the Union to come up as a global actor in the field of common security and defence policy and it was revised in 2008. After the revision of the document eight years have passed before a new strategic concept started to take shape. However, some Member States, such as Italy, Poland, Finland, Spain and Sweden urged the elaboration of a new strategy since 2009. Finally, in 2016, after the Brexit referendum, Federica Mogherini presented the EU's new strategic document entitled "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy". The Council welcomed the strategy on 28th of June. It is a significant difference between the strategy from 2003 and from 2016 that in 2003 the Council accepted the document but in 2016 they only welcomed it.¹

This paper examines if there is a need for an updated or revised Global Strategy. My thesis is that three years are not enough to assess a complex document like the EUGS. It has several objectives and priorities the successful implementation of which requires not just institutional reforms but also consensus among Member States on topics which impact on the sphere of national sovereignty. Nowadays euroscepticism affects the decision making process of the EU remarkably through those decisions which are related to the common foreign and security policy.

In my opinion five years should pass before the EUGS is updated and revised. The trial or first cycle of many projects have just started, so now we cannot assess them comprehensively: we need time to see their flaws and vulnerabilities and correct them before we repeatedly launch new projects. Foremost we should focus on the ongoing projects and for this duty the EUGS is enough.

¹ Molnár, A. (2016). Az EU Global is kül- és biztonságpolitikai stratégiája. Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont, Elemzések 2016/9. <https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu-1506332684763/svkk-elemzesek-2016-9-az-eu-globalis-strategiaja-molnar-a.original.pdf>

In order to scrutinize my thesis the essay is divided into four sections and sub-questions are analysed in each of them. The sub-questions will mostly focus on the EUGS' internal agenda, however, there is no hard line between the strategy's internal and external nexus.

The main terms of the essay are strategic autonomy, soft and hard power. In my research the definition of strategic autonomy is the following: *“strategic autonomy as the ability to set one's own priorities and make one's own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone.”*² Soft power for me means: *“the use of a country's cultural and economic influence to persuade other countries to do something, rather than the use of military power”*.³ while hard power means the use of military power rather than cultural or economic influence.⁴

² Lippert, B. & von Ondarza, N. & Perthes, V. (eds.). (2019). European Strategic Autonomy. SWP Research Paper 2019/RP 04. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e258>

³ Cambridge Dictionary. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/soft-power>

⁴ Cambridge Dictionary. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hard-power>

4. Current State of Research

Every year the Union publishes a review about the EUGS based on the objectives they have achieved in that year. These reviews also point to the future steps.

Moreover, every organisation of the EU which takes part in the implementation of the Global Strategy provides reviews about their work and annual work schedule. Since I am going to focus on the Common Security and Defence Policy, I would like to examine those parts of the EUGS which are related to that. Namely, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning of Conduct and Command (MPCC), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Peace Facility (EPF). The Union provides information about these projects from time to time.

Previous works have focused on European strategic thinking and the revision of the Global Strategy. From Hungary Dr. Anna Molnár has studied European strategic thinking as well as the circumstances of the EUGS adaptation and its content. In her work from 2016, she examined European strategic thinking and the way a new strategy was created.

A more recent study was published by Sven Biscop in March 2019. The title of his work is “The EU Global Strategy 2020”. The author claims that we should review the Global Strategy when the new Commission is in place following the May 2019 European elections.⁵ In his analysis he calls for a regular and systematic review of the EUGS for which a settled procedure is absent. He draws our attention on three essential features for the establishment of a revision process. These key features are: a small drafting team (including at least on expert from outside the EU institutions); intense consultation with MS; and input from the academic world.

In another work of Biscop, which was published in September 2019, the author argues about the EU’s role in the world that it cannot just be the world’s professor neither the world’s policeman. “We have to make sure that we have the power to make our ideas work in the real world,” claims Biscop.⁶ He proposes that the 2020 edition of the EUGS should be ready by the end of next spring. In his view the EU has to engage in world

⁵ Biscop, S. (2019). The Eu Global Strategy 2020. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/03/SPB108.pdf>

⁶ Biscop, S. (2019). The Power to Engage: Giving Punch to a new EU Global Strategy 2020. Security Policy Brief. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/09/SPB114.pdf>

affairs with political, economic and military power. He also announces a bumper sticker for the 2020 Global Strategy, which is “The Power to Engage”.

I can totally agree with Mr Biscop’s suggestions. I see his points, however, in some aspects I share other authors’ different ideas.

Focusing on European strategic culture the European Council on Foreign Relations published an article about Europe’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy in July 2019. The paper argues about the Member States’ ambitions related to the European strategic autonomy. It also pays attention to the EU’s capability building measures and the issue of strategic sovereignty which is essential in this more contested world.⁷ It is an interesting comprehensive study which provides a deeper view into the strategic culture of the Union.

We can see that several authors examine the EUGS and one of its main goals, strategic autonomy. In my paper my I used the above mentioned authors’ points of view as a guideline to help to formulate my thesis and the answer to it. Besides, I consulted with a military officer whose suggestions helped me to understand the military aspects of the topic.

The previous studies do not cover the whole issue of my research question. Neither of them compared the current security environment to the state of implementation of the EUGS’ objectives in order to decide what specific means should be revised in the Global Strategy. This is the area where my research can produce new results. It is important to come up with concrete suggestions and ideas and not just speak in broader terms.

⁷ Franke, U. & Varma, T. (2019). European Council on Foreign Relation. Independence Play: Europe’s Pursuit.https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy#

5. Research Gap

This paper is divided into four sections based on the research sub-questions. A detailed discussion of the European Union's partner programs falls outside the scope of this paper due to reasons of space. Furthermore, the essay does not contain mental concepts about the establishment of a European army and its organisational background, however, I will give a personal opinion about this topic since it affects the EU's strategic autonomy, which is a key objective of the Global Strategy.

In nowadays' multipolar world structure where the distribution of power is more fragmented, moreover, interdependence and contestation between nations and alliances is increasing significantly, it is essential for the European Union to have a coherent strategic concept. The Global Strategy provides a frame for common strategic thinking within the EU so that the Union is able to champion its interests not only at regional but also at global levels. This strategy has to be updated and revised from time to time in order that it will not become obsolete and so as to enable the Union to give a proper answer to current and future challenges. This is why my topic is important.

6. Research Question

This essay is divided into four sections, in which I am going to examine my sub-questions.

The Section One gives a brief overview of the current security environment of the world. What types of new challenges and threats must the EU face? I would like to outline those challenges which are not mentioned in the Global Strategy.

Section Two analyses the implementation of the EUGS objectives. Which have been implemented so far and in which phase of implementation are they? Linked to this question I also touch upon what more we could do in the frame of the EUGS to reach its goals. In the third section I examine if there is any action which could or should be taken but the EUGS does not mention?

Finally, after the examination of the questions above, I would like to focus on the new objectives and policies (if there are any) that we should incorporate into the Global Strategy. What type of new objectives should we set in order to provide the Union's security and resilience, ensure its strength, reliability and credibility. My conclusions are drawn by answering these sub-questions.

7. Methodology

To assess the European Union's Global Strategy I mostly used secondary data such as the yearly reports of the EUGS, other authors' research and publications from the EU's websites. I examined all available literature to get acquainted with the selected topic, however, I had some limitations. My main limitation was my knowledge of languages consequently I only analysed English and Hungarian literature. My sources comprised the internet, digital libraries and publications. Besides I also used primary data. I regularly consulted with my supervisor discussing questions related to my topic.

I developed a working hypothesis which is that five years should pass before the Global Strategy is updated. To form the basis of certain assumptions I collected information that enables me to conclude if my hypothesis was right. I followed four logically connected research questions throughout my essay.

I also used graphs and diagrams to illustrate my answers.

8. Results and research results

The EUGS have five priorities which are the security of the Union; state and social resilience to our east and south; an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; cooperative regional orders; and global governance for the 21st century.⁸ In this paper I am going to focus on the security of the Union and examine the current state of security environment, the breakthroughs which we achieved in the past three years and test my research thesis.

8.1. The world we live in 2019

In her foreword to the three years' assessment of the EU's Global Strategy, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, highlights that nowadays the world is in no better shape than it was in 2016.⁹ According to the report's first chapter we live in a more connected, complex and contested world where uncertainty and rivalry are increasing. However, only a few new challenges and threats emerged in the past few years. Below is a list of those challenges which are mentioned in the EUGS and those which are prominent in 2019.

Threats in 2016 (Based in the 2016 EUGS)	Threats in 2019
Terrorism	Terrorism Illegal migration
Hybrid threats	Hybrid threats – cyber threats
Economical instability	Economical instability
Climate change	Climate change
The absence of energy security	The absence of energy security
	Proliferation
	Arms race

Table 1: The threats we are facing with in 2016 and 2019.¹⁰

⁸ A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. June 2016.

⁹ The European Union's Global Strategy – Three Years on, Looking Forward. Page 4. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf

¹⁰ Table created by the author, 2019.

As we can see, the factors which threaten us are mainly the same and there are no significant changes in the global security environment. The EUGS 2019 review states that non-proliferation and arms control are at a risk.¹¹ The world's strategic stability has altered since the United States of America quit the INF-treaty and likely will not renew the START-III agreement.¹² It is a huge drawback in the field of arms control. Moreover, the new precision weapons and weapon systems, technologies and new ways of warfare might lead to the destabilisation of the current world order. Another problem is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, especially in politically unstable regions where conflicts are undergoing and extremism, terrorism, the extending power of non-state actors are concrete threats. To solve these problems comprehensive treaties should be accepted in the field of non-proliferation and arms control.¹³

Let me also mention the destabilising factor of the new arms race which has begun between great powers and indicated new acquisitions of armament in Europe, too. Especially because of the NATO membership of some European countries since President Donald Trump placed pressure on them.¹⁴

Secondly, I would like to point out the hybrid threats which involve all kinds of “grey zone” tools, for instance disinformation, cyber attacks, psychological operations, indirect influencing of the society.¹⁵ As a result of their disguised nature they are more risky than the conventional means of conflicts. Furthermore, they can be applied within the Union itself, between Member States. The EU suffers from an existential crisis which opens the field of intrigue between Member States.¹⁶

¹¹ Ibid. page 8.

¹² Johnson, D. (2019). General Gerasimov on the Vectors of the Development of Military Strategy. Russian Studies Series 04/2019

¹³ Author's note: Conclusion based on the author's arguments so far.

¹⁴ Reuters. (2019). NATO Moves Towards Spending Goal Sought by Trump, Spain Lags. <https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/11/29/world/europe/29reuters-nato-summit-stoltenberg.html>

¹⁵ Resperger, I. (2018). A válságkezelés és a hibrid hadviselés. Dialóg Campus Kiadó. Budapest. https://nbi.uni-nke.hu/document/nbi-uni-nke-hu/Resperger%20István_A%20válságkezelés%20és%20a%20hibrid%20hadviselés.pdf

¹⁶ European Council of Foreign Relations. How to Save Europe? URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_to_save_europe

8.2. The implementations of the EUGS' objectives

The most important characteristics related to the military capabilities of the armed forces of Member States are coherence, deployability and interoperability. In the past three years in the field of security and defence the EU achieved a historic breakthrough. In line with the 2016 EUGS several projects had been realised. In this section I would like to outline four of them which are important institutionally and which help Member States to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces within an EU framework.¹⁷

First of all, let me start with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was established by the Council in 2017. Its objective is to provide a binding framework in order to enhance defence investments, cooperation and operational readiness among the Member States. Today PESCO has 25 participating states and 47 ongoing projects which covering areas like training, land, maritime, air, cyber and joint enablers. The key factor here is to strengthen defence cooperation and interoperability between the forces of Member States by letting them individually engage in commitments to each other.¹⁸

Secondly, I would like to mention the European Defence Fund (EDF), which provides the funds to support the implementation of cooperative defence projects in general, particularly in the area of defence research and development.¹⁹ Related to EDF, the European Peace Facility (EPF) is another fund which is designed as an off-budget fund to finance all Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) external action with military or defence implications. The proposal is going to start its first implication term in 2021.²⁰

I will continue with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which provides an overview of where we stand and identifies the future cooperation opportunities. The CARD has finished its trial run and will start its first full cycle in autumn 2019.²¹ It monitors the implementation of EU capability development whose priorities are identified by the Capability Development Plan (CDP).

¹⁷ The European Union's Global Strategy – Three Years on, Looking Forward. Op. cit. P. 10.

¹⁸ About PESCO. <https://pesco.europa.eu>

¹⁹ European defence fund. https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund_en

²⁰ Questions & Answers: The European Peace Facility. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46286/european-peace-facility-qa_en

²¹ European Defence Agency. Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) . (26 November 2018). https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-11-26-factsheet_card.pdf

I finish this review of the established EUGS projects with the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which is a permanent command and control structure at military strategic level within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). It helps the EU to react faster and more efficiently to a conflict or crisis. It was established in 2017 and by the end of 2020 it will take responsibility for the operational planning and conduct of the non-executive military CSDP missions.²²

To sum up this section, we could see the newly launched projects have started to work. These are big steps in the implementation of the Global Strategy and now we are on our way to archive strategic autonomy. There is a vision of a well coordinated, coherent institutional system where each of the system's components helps work and they are heading towards a common goal. The Capability Development Plan sets out what things we should focus our common effort on. According to it, in the frame of PESCO, Member States are able to start to collaborate. The EDF and EPF provide the money in order to support the implementation of these defence projects and the CARD monitors and assesses the state of defence cooperation in Europe.

8.3. Actions which we could or should implement but the EUGS does not mention

The EUGS put greater emphasis on the EU's own security, defence capabilities and defence cooperation than the previous strategic documents. Besides, it does not mention the necessity of the establishment of a European army. However, the state of strategic autonomy is a vital goal of the strategy and it cannot be reached without a real operational military capability.²³

As I defined the term of strategic autonomy in my introduction, it is the *“ability to set our own priorities and make our own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone”*. It is clear that we cannot reach this state only with the use of soft power. Today's threats cannot be deterred with the use of traditional foreign policy tools of sticks and carrots. Furthermore, Europe must not take NATO, especially U.S. protection for granted. We

²² The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). (November 2018). https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf

²³ Molnár, A. (2016). Op. cit. P. 7.

should not depend on the Americans. The EU is in the G3, it is a global player and all global players need real military capabilities which can be provided by the establishment of an army. This type of hard power suits the fulfilment of the ambition of strategic autonomy and the enables us to act more sufficiently as a global security provider.²⁴

Of course the establishment of a European army in the frame of the Union has many obstacles. It affects the national sovereignty which is a fragile topic between the Member States. It is something which we could not agree on easily, everyone should make a concession and it is not obvious that all Member States could do it. Especially the ones who are more eurosceptic and are against deeper integration. As this picture below shows, the European strategic autonomy is not an important goal for all the MS. More than the Member States 45% think that it is not important or they are clearly against it. Only 25% of them consider it as a necessary thing.



Figure 1: How important is the goal of European strategic autonomy to your country's foreign and defence policy?²⁵

²⁴ Based on an interview with Colonel Zsolt Szilágyi, chief of the Hungarian EOD and Warship Regiment.

²⁵ Source of picture:

https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy#

8.4. New objectives

According to the results above there are two new objectives that we should incorporate in the Global Strategy.

First of all we should act as a stakeholder and initiate a new agreement about non-proliferation and arms control. The most suitable forum for this is the United Nation since it contains all countries of the Globe.

A comprehensive international agreement about non-proliferation and arms control is not just the interest of the EU but of other nations, too. The Union has the necessary political and economic weight and influence to initiate something like that. It would enhance the global security and predictability which directly influences the Union's security.²⁶

The second initiative which should be incorporated in the EUGS is the enhancement of hard power tools and building a deterrent capability. We need military power if we want to provide global security. Without real and common operational capabilities we are not able to promote our interests because our ambitions lead further into the reinforcement of our role on a global stage. PESCO is a perfect start and first step on this way but we should not stop here and be satisfied.²⁷

To conclude, I would like to underline that these two initiated objectives are extremely ambitious and affect the national sovereignty of Member States but also essential for a greater integration. A new Commission have just formed so we do not know their intentions yet according to this topic.

I would also like to point out that in my opinion focusing on the present projects would be an appropriate solution to my research question. We cannot concentrate on everything all the time. Firstly, we have to fully implement our ongoing projects and when they are working we can start to deal with new challenges. There is a proverb in Hungary: a person who starts to deal with too many things, will fall under the bench between two chairs (*Ki sok felé kap, két szék között a pad alá esik.*)²⁸ The Union should

²⁶ Author's note: Conclusion based on the author's arguments so far.

²⁷ Author's note: Conclusion based on the author's arguments so far after an interview with a military officer, mentioned above.

²⁸ Arcanum. <https://www.arcanum.hu/hu/online-kiadvanyok/Szolasok-regi-magyar-szolasok-es-kozmondasok-1/erdelyi-janos-magyar-kozmondasok-konyve-2E62/p-4668/6130-ki-sok-fele-kap-ket-szek-kozott-a-pad-ala-esik-466C/>

not make this mistake. We have to make a list of our objectives and start to implement them in order.

9. Discussion of Results

As predicted, my results show that there are no such significant changes which require a revised Global Strategy now. We are faced with the same threats as in 2016, they are just intensified as the world has become more interdependent. Three years on the EUGS have just started to implement its objectives and have not achieved all the goals.

After I have examined my research questions I made the conclusion that now we do not need to update the Global Strategy. We should let it work for five years and update it in 2021. But the conclusion of the essay should be interpreted with caution. I have only studied the state of the security of our Union and I left out the transatlantic relationships, the questions about the cooperation with NATO. It leaves the discussion open to several arguments against my thesis. Now I would like to highlight some cons.

Contrary to the conclusions above, some scholars might say that we should not just concentrate on the current projects but look into the future and start to take actions in order to be prepared for the forthcoming events. If we only focus on the present then we can find ourselves behind. So now let us support the ongoing projects but also name the new needs and incorporate them into the Strategy. Thus, when in 2021 we have the smoothly working projects, we do not have to think about what to do next: we will have our answers. This spares time for the Union.

However, our EUGS related projects have been only working for a few years or have just been in a trial cycle. First of all, we should concentrate on these elements and test them to see their limitations and flaws which we can correct later. In my opinion we should not rush into new challenges and start new projects until the old ones are all working reliably and smoothly. Our task should be to monitor their work in the next two years. After that we can start to launch new projects.

I can argue this point of view in another way too. Due to the fact that now there are no concrete concepts about completely new steps it would take time to come up with new ideas. It also takes time to agree with the Member States about new concepts. So it would take at least for a year to update the EUGS. But then we are nearly in 2021, so, as far as I can judge, it is enough to revise the document in 2021.

Another remarkable point is that if we update the Strategy too often we could miss the big picture and make a mistake that we only focus on the smaller steps. But that is

called a tactical and not a strategic thinking. A strategy sees the world affairs and the Union's place in the world order in a longer term.

Moreover, it is hard to reach agreements between Member States about CSDP related questions. We cannot predict if they would be interested in a revised strategy or not. The Union is more divided than ever, which creates obstacles in the way of a deeper integration on common security projects. The revision of the EUGS does not depend on the High Representative or experts, it depends on the political leaders of Member States. Their motivations influence the future of the Global Strategy. We could witness that thirteen years had to pass before the Union came up with an up-to-date strategic document and it was only welcomed by the Council and not accepted. In case this tendency continues we cannot be sure that the update of the EUGS will be feasible. Also a new Commission have just started their work. There is a chance that the new President of the Commission wants to update the strategy. We will see.

To sum up my work, I think that we need a substantial strategic culture and strategic autonomy in order to build a strong and resilient Union. To achieve this we need an up-to-date Global Strategy which enables us to respond to the threats correctly and in a joined-up way so that we can promote our interests sufficiently in this fragile world. As Mr. Sven Biscop said, we need a systematic and regular review of the Global Strategy. In my opinion this should happen in every five years because this amount of time is enough to see and predict new trends and set new goals in line with them.

10. Annexes

10.1. List of Abbreviations

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Definition</i>
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EDF	European Defence Fund
EPF	European Peace Facility
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union’s Global Strategy
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
G3	Group of 3
INF-treaty	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
START-III.	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States

10.2. List of Figures

Figure 1: How important is the goal of European strategic autonomy to your country's foreign and defence policy?..... 14

10.3. List of Tables

Table 1: The threats we are facing with in 2016 and 2019

10.4. List of Literature

1. Molnár, A. (2016). Az EU Global is kül- és biztonságpolitikai stratégiája. Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont, Elemzések 2016/9. <https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu-1506332684763/svkk-elemzesek-2016-9-az-eu-globalis-strategiaja-molnar-a.original.pdf>
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
11. Affidavit

Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.


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Laura Szilágyi
Budapest, Hungary in December 2019